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Introduction
Over the past few decades and especially at the turn of the century, there has been a flurry 
of reforms proposed and passed by governments in the Middle East, seeking to of modernization, 
as well as promising progress towards a more democratic, politically-open society.  Faced with 
growing international criticism for their anti-democratic processes, deteriorating economic 
conditions, and internal political upheavals and political opposition, rulers of these regimes have 
been compelled to implement measures that seem to open the political arena to more 
contestation, relax restrictions on political participation, and amend constitutions with great 
frequency in order to deflect such criticisms.  The rulers of these many of these countries speak 
the language of democracy, promising further political reform, but do these promises and 
reforms necessarily guarantee a transition to a more democratic system? Or are these measures a 
mere smoke screen, cleverly implemented to cushion authoritarian regimes from domestic and 
international criticisms while at once retaining power?  
This paper intends to discuss a specific case of Middle Eastern regimes, the partial 
autocracy, and its experience with democratization and the challenges the process faces.  I will 
first examine the methods used to analyze Arab authoritarianism in comparative politics, 
followed by a discussion of views concerning the nature of democracy in an Arab context and 
how society at large interprets its message.  I will examine the major players in the political 
arena who have the power to change the political system, namely the ruling party or individual, 
the liberals, and the Islamists, all of which have proven to be the only viable political actors for 
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reasons discussed later.  After identifying the actors, I will largely take up the recent research that 
focuses on the durability of semi-authoritarian regimes in the Arab world and why such systems 
of government have endured for so long without any fundamental change in the political order.   
Such a discussion will mostly focus on institutions, such as security forces, election rigging, and 
the co-option of opposition groups that have been implemented for the perpetuation of autocratic 
rule, steering clear of stereotypical arguments that blame Islam for the autocratic phenomenon.  
To illustrate the points which I intend to make and the authors’ theses I intend to support, 
I critically examine the example of Morocco, as it is heralded as one of the most promising 
examples of a partial autocracy making a democratic transition.  I will focus on tools of 
democracy that the regime uses to manipulate oppositional forces, such as the Constitution and 
parliamentary election allocations.  I will also examine the role that moderate Islamic movements 
have played in the country and how they have managed to pose as a oppositional political force, 
and the general trends observed when Islamic political groups interact with the political system, 
such as adopting more moderate and tolerant platforms.  The strategies used by the regime and 
the Islamists when considering inclusive politics will also be addressed.  My thesis will support 
the inclusion of these Islamists in the political process as the only viable way to spur democratic 
change in the Middle East, namely Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD).   Their 
large support base, strong internal organization, relative independence from the regime, and their 
ability to adapt to democratic institutions have been shown in the case of Morocco, and bode 
well as helpful steps towards democratic consolidation.  I end by suggesting that oppositional 
forces need to unite in order to break the political deadlock that has managed to keep these states 
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from advancing on the path of democratization. 
Getting to Pluralism: Operating a Partial Autocracy with Three Political Actors
A principle source around which I will frame the discussion will be the recent publication 
from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, authored by Marina Ottaway, Amr 
Hamzawy, and Michele Dunne, entitled Getting to Pluralism: Political Actors in the Arab World.  
The authors of the group’s most recent publication, a culmination of years of research on the 
subject of democracy promotion in the region, have concluded that governments in the Middle 
East have reached an impasse due to the gross imbalance of power between the only three viable 
political actors in the region: the regime, secular groups, and the Islamists.  Due to the power 
disparity that manifests itself in the regime’s favor, opposition groups, though existent and viable 
in the controlled arena in which they operate, do not pose a threat to regime security.  Thus true 
democratic reforms cannot be implemented with the amount of unchecked powers that are 
exercised by the regime.   These disparities, according to the authors, are due not only to the 
power exercised by the regimes, but also because of weaknesses in the secular and Islamist 
opposition groups, due to divisions within between hardliners and moderates, as well as a lack of 
consistent participatory politics and internal disorganization that keep secular parties perpetually 
weak. Externally, secular groups have either been co-opted by the regime to keep them weak or 
as political assets.  Such examples include the Moroccan USFP, co-opted by the government in 
an attempt to quell their criticisms while simultaneously protecting them from a perceived 
Islamic threat.  As far as the Islamic opposition, the parties have been condemned to a smaller 
Matthew Ward








Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Middle East
22 Dec 2009
5
political arena in which they are allowed to operate.  Such discrimination is attributable to the 
preconceived notion that once to power, Islamists would like nothing more than to abrogate the 
democratic system that elected them.  
In sum, the opposition faces many of the same challenges internally as well as externally 
as the regimes do, although they have an uncontested monopoly on power that allows them to 
dominate and dictate domestic policies and stave off real democratic reforms.  These obstacles 
have led to stagnation and a political deadlock from which there is no immediate remedy.  Such a 
cure can only be advanced if the secular opposition is able to reform itself structurally, and the 
Islamists are able to reconcile differences between their hardliners and moderates, as well as 
between fundamental ideological concerns and the pragmatics of participating in a competitive 
political process.
This process cannot better illustrated itself than in the Moroccan parliamentary process 
and the relationship with the monarch.   In Morocco, the institution of the monarch is able to at 
once allow parliamentary pluralism with contested election, co-opt troublesome opposition 
forces by playing off the popular fear of the Islamists by the liberals, acting as a benevolent 
arbitrator between competing voices, and keep all the power consolidated in his hands. To 
support the observation made in Getting to Pluralism on the co-optive nature of these regimes, 
Professor Daniel Brumberg suggests that the monarchy has adopted a policy of “dissonance” 
politics (37, 40).  In dissonance politics, the regime leaves a “symbolic distance between the state 
and society”, allow different groups to contend as opposition in a political arena (40).  This tactic 
allows Islamists to compete with non-Islamic political groups and to create a space for political 
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discussion that has the effect of discrediting and excluding extremist groups, benefiting the 
state’s security, decreasing the cost of political liberalization, and at the same time, validating 
moderate, Islamic political positions vis-à-vis the state.  Under this policy, “the more such 
contention there is, the likelier it is that rulers will risk an opening”, allowing the ruler to act as 
an arbitrator between the many competing political groups (Brumberg 40).  This tactic further 
legitimizes and increases the political import of the ruler.  This political tactic is much more 
effective than “harmonic” politics, in which the state imposes a unitary nationalist or religious 
ideology upon the population, represses opposition, and often leads to “‘counterhegemonic’ 
Islamist opposition movements whose presence increases the expected cost of political 
liberalization” (Brumberg 37).  
In the case of Morocco, the monarch has decided to adopt a policy of dissonance.  The 
tactic has been able to “pit one group against another in ways that maximize the rulers’ room for 
maneuver and restrict the opposition’s capacity to work together” (Brumberg 40).  The tactics of 
this partial autocracy is one of divide and rule, and in Morocco, the King takes advantage of a 
proportionally-elected parliament of over 30 political parties, a co-opted loyalist liberal coalition, 
and a constitution that naturally perpetuates the political domination of the King (The 2007, 2; 
Chambre).  
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Interpreting Political Stagnation: Arab Semi-Authoritarianism and the “King’s 
Dilemma”
The essays in Getting to Pluralism, however, fall short of addressing a viable solution to 
the political stalemate, only suggesting that the oppositional groups reorganize themselves in a 
way that would evolve into meaningful political opposition to pressure the government to 
implement real democratic reforms, in addition to the social and economic ones undertaken in 
the last decade.  While the authors touch briefly on the mechanisms that keep these autocrats in 
power, they do not expound upon the role of these institutions, such as the security forces, 
election manipulation, and other regime tactics that mean to perpetuate their rule.  The essays 
also do not address authoritarianism itself, which is at the heart of the inability for these groups 
to break free of the political deadlock.  Therefore, in addition to this ground-breaking paper, a 
discussion about the nature of authoritarianism in the context the Middle East is crucial to 
understanding the mechanisms that create the rules for the political game, as well as to appreciate 
the adversity the opposition faces.  This discussion of the uses and import of executive power 
serves to underline the core issue perpetuating the democratic stagnation that has taken hold of 
the Arab world in an era when more citizens are growing politically apathetic and disillusioned 
with their political options. 
 One theory that seeks to explain the authoritarian grip on power in the region was put 
forth by Samuel Huntington is the theory of the “King’s Dilemma”.  The paper highlights the 
concerns that autocrats in the region have over losing their grip on power, suggesting that a 
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controlled, top-down reform model would lead to the masses demanding more from their 
government, until its eventual collapse and the dissolution of the regime.  In Getting to 
Pluralism, Marina Ottaway and Michele Dunne write about the phenomenon of managed top-
down reform in the form of economic and social change in these countries, while political 
reforms have been lacking.  The rulers view democratization “as an obstacle to the development 
of a more dynamic economy and a more efficient administration--and of course as a threat to 
their power” (Getting 17).  Noting the case of Morocco, the authors write that this is the reason 
for why the government has “committed to a vigorous reform program in the realm of human 
rights and, increasingly, economic development, [that] has given no sign that it perceives the 
need to build stronger political institutions at the same time” (Getting 17).  
While this strategy of top-down reform might be viable as a short-term reform policy of 
reform, it becomes problematic in the long-term when considering what the process of such 
reform leads to.  Democratic reforms in the long-term inevitably imply the incumbent regime’s 
loss of power, or at least the ability of the opposition to eventually contest the key seats of power 
in an open political environment.  Thus, in order to truly open to a process of democratization, 
the authoritarian must choose to relinquish their power.  The process depends on human agency, 
and thus a likely push from the bottom to the top, as Huntington views it, cannot yield many 
results, as he has underestimated the strength and political mechanisms and institutions that keep 
Arab regimes in power. 
  As addressed in Getting to Pluralism, the opposition is severely divided, the population 
is largely politically apathetic, and the will and ability to suppress dissent is very high.  Though 
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touched on in her essay, Ottaway does not develop this counter point sufficiently, except to 
suggest that democratization would happen with the moderate splinters in the regime that see 
democratization as inevitable due to view that world trends towards more liberal, democratic 
systems would be highly beneficial for their country (Getting 15).  The theory of regime collapse 
from the bottom to the top depends too much on the role of the masses without addressing the 
role of democratic institutions, divisions within the opposition that render it weak, the strength of 
security forces, international pressure, and the general population’s political apathy.
  Top-down reform has indeed been effective in developing better governing strategies 
and bringing economic and social change such as in Morocco, and indeed the language of liberal 
democracy has caught the attention of these rulers as the only true, legitimate form of 
government, as they feel “the pressure to demonstrate the new vitality and continued relevance 
of their rule...[and] want to be viewed as constitutional monarchs” (Getting 15).  These tactics of 
limited social and economic reform sans the political, however, cannot continue indefinitely and 
has its limits concerning the degree of democratization it can bring to a country.  With the 
unlikelihood of such a benevolent ruler relinquishing the key offices of power for purely 
democratic principles, there must be just as much concentration on developing bottom-up 
reform, encouraging the strong support and resources that Islamist political groups possess to 
internally reform in order to more effectively sidestep government restrictions.  A strong, 
organized, and ideologically cohesive oppositional movement might deliver more results at the 
ballot box by imbuing greater confidence in political participation on the part of the masses, 
perhaps increasing political interest and participation. This may also pressure the government to 
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deliver real political reforms that the public demands to deliver on better governance and 
accountability, rather than waiting for a just ruler to deliver it.  What will follow is a discussion 
about Arab authoritarianism, the mechanisms that keep in power that Huntington has not 
addressed in his essay, and the political experience of Morocco.  First, however, I wish to give an 
overview of how scholars have chosen to study political change and stagnation in a region that 
has managed to stave off meaningful, democratic reforms.  
Matthew Ward












Towards a More Democratic System?
Before addressing democracy in the region, the case of Morocco, and its experience with 
democratization, it is necessary to first address a scholarly dichotomy that has taken hold of the 
academic world in recent years concerning the political trajectory of Middle Eastern regimes, as 
well as how the topic has been studied in general in the literature of comparative politics.  The 
dichotomy to which I elude addresses whether or not the Arab world is on the path to a truly 
democratic transition or whether the path has been further hampered by failed reforms, promises, 
and political manipulation.  I begin supporting the negation of the former branch of the 
dichotomy. This stance is also articulated by Oliver Schlumberger in the study and evidence 
concerning the general political development in the Arab world.  In the introduction of his book, 
he claims that there are two camps of scholars in the observation of Arab political developments: 
those who believe that the Arab world is on a path to genuine, democratic reform since in recent 
years, and those who believe that the region has been democratically stagnant (Schlumberger, 
2-5).  In the first camp, the optimists point to three phenomena that have reappeared since the 
early 2000s that point to expectations that democratic reform is close: political protests, political 
reforms, and “more visible reform exerted by external players” (Schlumberger, 2).  Internally, he 
cites the Kifaya movement in Egypt, to which thousands took to the street to protest rigged 
elections.  There was also the notable reforms in Morocco’s personal status code for women, and 
in the Saudi Arabian local elections, noting that “Middle Eastern rulers have started to vie for 
international attention for engaging in political reform...in the area of 
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governance” (Schlumberger 3).  Externally, powers such as the United States have been paying 
increasing lip service to the necessity of democratic reform in order to curb international security 
concerns such as terrorism, citing the US Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), as well as 
World Bank and other initiatives and constraints imposed by international organizations to 
encourage democratic growth and an improvement in political and human rights (Schlumberger 
3-4). The semi-authoritarian system appears to be challenged from both internal and external 
actors, and autocrats appear to be responding to both sources of pressure in a way that gives the 
appearance of democratic change.  
These arguments, however, do not necessarily lead to this camp’s conclusion that true 
democratic reform is taking place.  This alternative stance, taken by the authors in the 
compilation of essays in Schlumberger’s book, seeks to address the real mechanisms that can 
trigger true democratic reform, notably addressing the real obstacle to democratic transition: the 
ever-enduring grip of authoritarianism and how, without fundamental, institutional changes in the 
redistribution of power, Arab societies will be unable to make true and lasting transitions to 
democracy.  The branch of this dichotomy has been further supported by phenomena such as the 
inclusion of oppositional forces, such as the Islamists, into the political arena that gives the 
impression that regimes in the region are moving away from more authoritarian styles of rule to a 
more democratic one.  Also, regimes promise not only political participation, but also 
meaningful, status-quo-altering competition, and promising real bids for power in the 
government that could seem as if democratization is on the agenda.  Such reforms, however, 
have led to no real shift in power from the regime to the parties elected in parliament or the 
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courts.  Independent institutions that work to curb a ruler’s or regime’s power and to effectively 
pressure for promised reforms do not exist.  Most reforms that have been implemented, 
moreover, have been purely economic and social, such as in Morocco, rather than political, 
giving the regime a “veneer of modernity” that have deafened the criticisms Western 
governments and domestic democrats cry in protest against such uneven consolidations of power 
(Getting 15).  
When using democratic institutions that the state does have in place, such as parliaments 
and constitutions, these regimes have been cleverly able to stuff them with their own supporters 
and pass constitutional amendments that in turn restrict opposition and strengthen and 
consolidate the regime’s power.  Marsha Posusney’s article addresses this phenomenon and the 
toll it takes on oppositional forces in the larger political system, against which governments use 
tadakhul and tawzir (interference and falsification) to manipulate elections (Posusney 91-92).  
She notes further that what is “more subtle than tadakhul or tawzir... [is] manipulating electoral 
design [which] offers incumbents another way to control electoral outcomes in an immediate 
sense and partisan politics in their countries more broadly” (Posusney 94). Such constitutions, 
such as the Moroccan Constitution, have also been cleverly crafted to keep power in the rulers’ 
hands, removing contestation for their seat of power from the public political domain.  Given 
these factors, I espouse the latter assertion concerning the Arab world’s political trajectory in that 
the region is not on a course towards a more democratic opening due to the lack of distribution of 
real power, the coercive institutions that keep these regimes in power, and the manipulation of 
democratic institutions that rulers have found “useful for dealing with regime-versus-opposition 
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conflicts, thereby paving the way for ‘democracy without democrats’” (Islamists). 
Matthew Ward








Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Middle East
22 Dec 2009
15
The Elusive Arab Autocrat and Arab Democracy in Comparative Politics 
Moving now to the study of these hardy authoritarian regimes in the field of comparative 
politics, Schlumberger writes that “only a handful of articles at the time of this writing aimed to 
explain the durable yet dynamic for of Arab authoritarianism...the discussion is still at a stage 
where no mainstream or academic consensus has emerged” (Schlumberger 8-9).  Echoing this 
sentiment, author Marsha Pripstein Posusney notes that “Middle Eastern cases are almost 
completely absent from the most important works on political transitions, including those that 
explicitly focus on the developing world”, focusing instead on successful cases of 
democratization (Enduring 127, 128).  The study of these authoritarian regimes and the lack of 
democracy in comparative politics has been broken down into two camps for the reasons 
explaining the lack of democracy in the region.  The first camp believes that Middle Eastern 
politics operates at a deficit when it comes to democratic institutions, culture, or due to Islam.  
The competing assumption is that it is human agency that will decide the course of 
democratizaiton, or those who view “democratization as a contingent choice of regime and 
opposition actors” (Enduring 128).  Again, given the evidence with the articles that will follow, I 
agree with Posusney’s assertion that both groups should be considered together to create a deeper 
understanding of the complexities of the political realities, because both of their 
“contributions...highlight the importance of various institutional arrangements for choices made 
by political activists and elites that serve to perpetuate authoritarian rule” (Enduring 128).  
The one mentioned factor, the common “orientalist” approach to analyzing the political 
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situation and the assertion that Islam is counter democracy, however, is a point that is mostly 
unfounded due to recent research.  Author Eva Bellin points out that other religions have once 
been incompatible with democracy, such as Catholicism and Confucianism, yet countries around 
the world that adhere to these religions were able to make a transition to democracy (Enduring 
128, Bellin 23-24).  Also, polling such as that which was undertaken by University of Michigan 
Professor Mark Tessler, shows that “Islamic attatchments have relatively little explanatory power 
so far as political attitudes are concerned...those individuals who are most religious...are no less 
likely than others to favor...democratic governance...” (Tessler).  Hiss assessment will be 
addressed later.
To continue with this method of considering both schools of thought in my analysis, I 
point to one example of how authoritarianism has been analyzed in the Middle Eastern context.  
Many articles and books have been written that ask why authoritarianism has endured for so long 
in the region while other regions of the world, notably Latin America and Eastern Europe, have 
made fairly successful transition to democratic systems of governance after the Cold War.  
Indeed, there have been many discussions about what can be done to wrest power from a small 
group of elite to distribute to the masses based on these cases.  In a world that is slowly 
becoming more integrated due to globalization and in which regions once characterized by the 
heavy hand of autocracy are making transitions to more democratically-inclined governments, 
the question raised concerning the governments of the Middle East has begun shelving the 
frustrating conundrum of how democracy has not taken root in the region.  The question now 
being asked is why “the vast majority of Middle Eastern and North African states have failed to 
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initiate transition at all...[that in which] lies the exceptionalism of the region” (Bellin 142).  In 
the political science field, research on democratic transition and autocratic collapse have largely 
ruled out the Middle East as an oddity that did not fit mainstream trends, and thus lent to the idea 
that the region was somehow exceptional due to its resilience against democratic transition 
(141-42).  The study of democratization in the Middle East has been a casualty over the years, 
often written off as Arab exceptionalism and ignored as failed cases.  After the fall of 
communism, as Tessler points outs, the Arab world was ignored, and thus theories about 
democracy could not be refined, nor could more general observations of democracy be observed 
(Political Attitude 1).  Scholarship has only recently turned its attention to the region, this time 
with a more comparative view in a quest to find similarities to other autocracies and their 
components around the world, rather than writing them off as exceptional.  
In readdressing Schlumberger, the question of why democracy has not taken root is less 
important than addressing and analyzing how authoritarian, or semi-authoritarian regimes, have 
remained resilient in face of global trends towards democratization.  It is first necessary to 
understand the complexities of authoritarianism before moving to policy suggestions and 
attempting to offer solutions to how democracy might take root.  To support this overarching, 
emerging observation that has caught the attention of political scientists in the field of autocratic 
durability in the Middle East, author Jason Brownlee asserts that “an explanation for the lack of 
democracy in the Arab world should begin with an explanation for the lack of regime change, 
namely, regime survival of domestic political conflicts (Brownlee 47).  These ”conflicts” to 
which Brownlee refers, though not mentioned specifically, must certainly be in reference to the 
Matthew Ward








Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Middle East
22 Dec 2009
18
issues with which the other authors in this paper have issue: the unhindered ability for durable, 
effective opposition movements to gather, independent judiciary and legislative branches, 
independent political institutions, a contestable political arena, human rights, and issues 
concerning civil liberties.  These domestic issues, couple with, exasperated, and perpetuated by 
the oppressive and uncanny durability of Arab autocrats, lend to the regions complete lack of true 
democratic roots.  Herein lies the exceptionalism of the Arab world, and herein lies the 
opportunity for further research to first understand the complexities and multi-layered challenges 
that face the people of the Middle East.  Research thus far has proven that there is one no key 
issue that can solve the problem of autocratic durability in the region.
The questions arisen are beginning to revolve around finding the root causes of such 
strong autocracies, and analyses have recently ranged from the power and interconnectedness of 
the security forces and their ability to manipulate and suppress dissent, economic rents and 
funding for oppressive regimes, lack of international pressure, and the internal manipulation of 
political parties for the benefit of autocratic support.  The concentration of my analysis on the 
durability of the Arab autocrat will be on the groundbreaking work that was initiated by authors 
Eva Bellin, Ellen Lust-Okar, and Marsha Pripstein Posusney, which first appeared in a special 
issue of Comparative Politics in January of 2004 (Schlumberger 8-9).  I will present these 
emerging studies of which the research is still in its infancy in order to use it as a background for 
understanding autocratic institutions, as well as the problems that face democratically-minded 
forces in the region.
Schlumberger, along with the more contemporary analysts employed in this paper such as 
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Evan Bellin and Jason Brownlee, prefer a structural analysis of authoritarian systems rather than 
providing positive or negative assessment of these semi-autocratic systems, leaving behind 
judgmental words such as “gap” and “deficit” when speaking about democracy.  The authors 
seek to deconstruct the mechanisms that keep these semi-autocrats in power rather than holding 
the region to a definition of democracy after Western models or holding only to the necessity of 
democratic “perquisites” (Enduring 128).  Schlumberger critiques this approach when discussing 
past attempts to analyze the region: “one thing remained constant: the popularity of an implicit 
frame of reference that analyzes middle Eastern politics against the normative background of 
how “the free world” would like to see Arab countries ruled” (Schlumberger, 6).  The assumption 
taken in the chosen articles in this paper treat authoritarianism as the root of the democratic 
stagnation and as a phenomenon that should be deconstructed and analyzed both dependently 
and independently from Western expectations and a balanced consideration should be the the 
starting point of any meaningful scholarly research.  This, therefore, is the assumption around 
which I frame the discussion about the democratic experience in the region.
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Eva Bellin’s Institutional Analysis of Security Apparatuses and the Myth of Arab Political 
Exceptionalism
In the first study on which Arab authoritarianism is based is an article written by Eva 
Bellin, entitled “Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders”, in Authoritarianism in the Middle 
East: Regimes and Resistance published in 2005.  She bases her analysis on the assumption that 
it is the power and will that regime security apparatuses enjoy as the reasons for why democratic 
initiatives in Arab countries are snuffed out before they are able to take root.  She discusses four 
factors that allow these security institutions to stay so powerful: funding paid by rents from 
natural resources found in the region, support from international actors, patrimonialistic 
appointment systems, and a lack of popular mobilization to push for meaningful, democratic 
reforms.  These factors, though not all exceptional to the region, contribute to the ability and the 
will to suppress oppositional forces in these countries for regime preservation.  She concentrates 
on institutional reasons for why democracy has not taken root rather than the region lacking any 
sort of democratic prerequisites that are inherent in the regions political and cultural history.  
Such arguments have in the past lead to the dead end conclusion of “Arab Political 
Exceptionalism” as the explaining factor for the resilience of Arab authoritarian regimes.
Her analysis begins with an assessment of the region’s political statistics.  Quoting 
Freedom House, she asserts that there has indeed been a global trend towards more open, 
democratic systems of government world wide, especially in the Americas and the Asia Pacific 
region since the early 1970s (21).  This trend, however, has been repelled by the Middle East, 
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and according to Freedom House scores, the region in some instances has remained stagnant or 
regressed slightly into more consolidated, authoritarian-style regimes.  According to the data that 
she presents, only Jordan has managed to move from the “Not free” classification to “Partly 
free”, and all countries in the MENA region, save Israel, fall under the categories of “Not free” 
and “Partially free” (22).1  
After addressing the region’s political statistics as proof of her claim, she offers common 
hypotheses as to why the region is an exceptional case in world politics, and concludes that weak 
economies, weak civil society, poverty, low literacy, societal inequalities, geography, and Islam 
are all unconvincing reasons to why democracy has not gripped the region (cite).  These 
“preconditions” to democracy are weak evidence to explain the phenomenon, as 
“democratization is so complex an outcome, no single variable will ever prove to be universally 
necessary or sufficient to compel it” (Huntington 1991: 38, Rustow 1970: 343: Bellin, 24).   She 
argues that the key to Arab exceptionalism does not lie in a given deficit of prerequisite to 
democracy, as many other regions sharing this have made the transformation to democracy, nor 
does it lie in the puzzle as to why democracy has failed in the region, mirroring Schlumberger’s 
call for a new approach to studying Arab authoritarianism.  The true point de départ lies rather 
why the region has “failed to embark upon transition at all” and in this “lies the exceptionalism 
of the region” (Bellin 24-25).  
The basis for Bellin’s analysis depends on literature of revolutions laid down by Theda 
Skocpol.  In his work, he notes the disconnect between the seemingly-abundant occurrences of 
1 Freedom House uses scores from 1-2.5 to signal as “free”, 3-5.5 as “part free”, and 5.5-7 as 
“not free”.  The scale’s formula is based on a complex questionnaire developed by the group that 
gauges civil liberties and political freedoms within a country.
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“democratic impulses”, such as civil society, yet there seems to be a limited number of 
successful revolutions that lead to a fundamental regime change.  It was hypothesized that there 
was a strong connection between the state’s security forces and successful attempts, as “the 
strength, coherence, and effectiveness of the state’s coercive apparatus” provides an inverse 
relationship to successful cases of revolution (Bellin 34).  Bellin ties this hypothesis of 
successful revolution attempts to attempts to democratize: “democratic transition can only be 
carried out successfully when the state’s coercive apparatus lacks the will or capacity to crush it” 
(34).  Thus, the exceptionalism in the vitality of these regimes lies in this will and capacity to 
stymie any democratic movement, and she does claims that in the Arab world, the existence of 
both conditions has led to the strength of the security apparatus and the durability of these 
regimes (143).
Based on her hypothesis that the security apparatuses are the root of the durability of 
Arab authoritarianism, she presents the four factors that keep them functioning: fiscal health, 
maintenance of international support networks, the will to repress (which is inversely linked to 
its level of institutionalization), patrionialism, and the lack of popular mobilization (Bellin 
27-29).  In the first, fiscal health, she highlights oil rent money, either from the state itself (such 
as Saudi Arabia), or exported to other countries (such as Morocco) who in turn provide guest 
workers, giving the state “access to substantial discretionary resources so that...the state is still 
able to hew to conventional economic wisdom and ”pay for itself first”, that is, “give first priority 
to paying the military and security forces” (32).  
Indeed, the Middle Eastern regimes fund their security apparatuses very well, and reserve 
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one of the highest percentages of their GDP to such expenditures in the world.  She points out 
that on average, nations of the world spend about 3.8% on their security forces, whereas the 
regional average lies around 6.7% (147).  She also notes that 40% of global arms sales in 2000 
went to only seven Middle Eastern countries, and the number of people that comprise these 
forces are also high (147).  To give a comparative perspective, Bellin cites that French security 
forces per capita is 6.31/1000, while in the Middle East it is around 16.2/1000 (147).  The extra 
discretionary spending supplied to these countries, whether because of domestic oil, gas, or 
mineral resources internally or the money sent back to home countries, is one of the few unique 
features of Arab authoritarian states and which lends to the ability to fund apparatuses, keeping 
them from giving way to democratization because of pressure from below.  
The second variable that Bellin claims strengthens the security forces is patrimonialistic 
systems of promotion that rely on personal connections to the rulers and their family, such as 
Morocco, Syria, and Saudi Arabia.  Bellin notes that this “Inter- intracorp  discipline is 
maintained by relying on balanced rivalry between primordial groups”, taking advantage of tribal 
associations, as in Jordan and Saudi Arabia (33).  Syria, for example, relies on political and 
religious associations for security appointments, balancing Ba’ath party members, Christians, 
Alawis, and Sunnis (33).  This lack of institutionalization based on political reliability creates 
another disconnect with society in addition to the rent funds, as security officials depend on their 
power and funding from the ruler’s directly.  An institutionalized system of appointment, on the 
other hand, would offer independence from the regime’s will, which currently “makes for the 
coercive apparatus’s personal identification with the regime and the regime’s longevity and thus 
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fosters resistance to political reform” (34).  She further asserts that the reason these security 
forces are resistant to democratic change is because, if democratization were to take place, “few 
of these officers could expect to ride electoral politics to power” (34).  
Another factor that Bellin cites as a condition keeping regimes in power is the lack of 
popular mobilization in the Middle East for democratic change.  Though not limited to the 
region, it compounds the difficulties of few oppositional forces that exist within these countries.  
Without a strong and consistent push for democratization on the part of the public, or even for 
serious reform, the cost associated to oppressing the opposition is low for the regime.  Bellin also 
notes that when opposition was high, the regimes were able to lessen such costs “by playing on 
the special threat posed by these particular forces” (35).  Most notably has been the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and a fear of Israel, and of the Islamists, a powerful oppositional force in the region.  The 
fear, which will be discussed later, revolves around the assumption that they will come to power 
and abrogate any democratic process once installed, or a fear of the imposition of an extreme 
version of Shari’a law upon society without the present regime to keep them check.  
In addition to the manipulation of popular mobilization by these regimes, Bellin asserts 
that the public itself is skeptical of any move towards democratization, as political liberalization 
experiments have historically been identified with colonialism and foreign domination, as well as 
the fact that there does not exist an enduring democratic experience in the region, nor are there 
any true democratic institutions to take advantage of (150).  In short, the region operates at an 
experience deficit that, in the face of these hardy regimes, renders any push for democratic 
institutions nearly impossible to take root.  Added with a strong security system and a regime 
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that possesses the will and power to suppress their population, any internal or external push for 
democratization is very difficult.
  Bellin’s argument seems to assert that though the removal of the security apparatus will 
not necessarily spell out democratic change, it’s absence is a necessary component in a push for 
impartial institutions and oppositional political life to take root.  In fact, she fears that a vacuum 
would be created and something more controlling or dangerous could fill the gap (153).  She 
only asserts that the presence of such an institution that guarantees suppressive will and 
capability will be certain to stop democratization in its tracks.  On the road to democratization, 
however, it is necessary for its removal, otherwise there is no possibility for advancement.  Also, 
without constraints on funding the apparatus, international pressure, formal institutionalization of 
security forces, and a politically-motivated population, democratic initiatives are politically 
meaningless.
Bellin’s also asserts that another factor that keeps these regimes in power and from 
initiating true democratic reform is fear.  The assumption in her paper, as well as in the Carnegie 
paper, Getting to Pluralism, seems to be that true democratization--meaning the electoral 
contestation of key seats of power--would not only compromise the current power institutions as 
they exist, but also the lives of those who hold the power (145-46).  Power, manifested partly in 
the will to suppress, the preservation of that power, and the benefits associated with it are enough 
of keep the will to do so strong.  Taking Bellin’s analysis into consideration and comparing it to 
the political realities laid forth by Getting to Pluralism and the “King’s Dilemma”, it is 
conceivable that top-down reform for the time being would be impractical on the part of the 
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ruler, as well as any international pressure to bring it about.  This would also contradict Marina 
Ottaway’s assumption that top-down reform, mentioned later, would be an effective long-term 
strategy.  As long as these regimes hold onto their patronage system through loyalty to the 
regime, are able to pay it from money not extracted from citizens as with rents, and fear political 
and even life-threatening reprisals by once-suppressed groups due to the opening up of the 
democratic process, Arab autocracies will continue to endure without any true top-down reform 
that leads to democratization.  
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Jason Brownlee and the Importance of International Pressure on Arab Regimes
To elaborate on the importance of international pressure on autocratic regimes, author 
Jason Brownlee offers an analysis of the total autocracies of the region, namely Iraq, Libya, 
Syria, and Tunisia, in which political contestation, even a superficial form of it like in Morocco, 
is illegal.  In these police states, the government has outlawed political opposition, especially 
Islamist groups and are notorious for their brutal crackdowns on uprisings and hints of unrest.  In 
his analysis, he seeks to explain why many autocracies that have historically repressed their 
populations brutally have eventually collapsed, yet others, such as the Middle Eastern North 
African regimes, have not.  He agrees with Bellin’s conclusion that the “critical variable 
accounting for authoritarian durability in these cases prove to be extensive repressive capacity 
and minimal externally imposed constraints on its use” (Brownlee 45).  Brownlee concludes that 
“it is the constraint upon personalistic rulers-mainly by an external superpower-that often brings 
their downfall “and it is that limitation...that the Middle East has lacked” (Brownlee 48).  He also 
chips away at the notion that the Middle East is somehow unique in its democratic deficit or 
unique in its oppressive techniques, noting that “authoritarian regimes withstanding domestic 
challenges through the unrestrained use of repression” is not an anomaly in the political science 
field (57).  
It would thus be helpful to once again use the approach of Bellin in piecemealing the 
many facets that for so long have lead to the myth of Arab exceptionalism and its exclusion from 
many political studies as irregular.  Brownlee warns, however, that “while independence from 
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foreign patronage may be a sufficient condition for the re-stabilization of a heavily patrimonial 
regime, it is not a necessary one”, and leaves the possibility for further research to be completed 
in the direction of regime change in order to find necessary consequences that foreign pressure 
has on repressive regimes (59).  Like Bellin’s conclusion that the removal of the security 
apparatus does not necessarily equivocate to the beginning of democracy, Brownlee notes that 
stronger international pressure does not necessarily mean a more constrained regime.  Both 
authors assert that what they suggest is that security apparatuses are roadblocks to democratic 
openings, and further research is needed in the field of democratization in the context of the Arab 
world and regime durability if democracy is ever to take root.  Brownlee notes also that there 
should be special attention paid to US Middle East policy towards both democracy promotion 
and the support of authoritarian regimes due to the mixed signals that often reach the Arab 
capitals.  He suggests that the policies should be a state by state case, and agreeing with Bellin, 
that the support of these regimes due to security interests spurred by oil and amplified threats of 
Islamic extremism have only worked to guarantee the continuity of these regimes (59).  
In regards to Islamic opposition, which the the authors in Getting to Pluralism supports 
as the strongest and most viable oppositional force in the Arab world, Brownlee notes that these 
groups’ efforts to muster support have been hampered by the fact that they are viewed as a 
security risk by the autocratic regime.  In this, the security interests of the US and the regime 
coincide, and a dangerous, symbiotic relation develops in such a way that the US government is 
convinced that often-brutal repression of the opposition will prevent a training ground for 
terrorism.  Such a policy is seen as preventing a security backlash against the US.  It fails to 
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realize that, “Islam provided a set of ideas for mobilizing against dictatorships” (60).  This paper, 
however, will not discuss the debate over whether or not Islam supports democracy, because such 
a debate depends on many factors, most important of them is who is interpreting Islam. I will 
instead focus on  Islamist political parties that have legitimized the political process through their 
participation, such as the Moroccan PJD.
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Surveying Support for Democracy in the Arab World
The next issue concerns how democracy is interpreted in the Arab world.  In Mark 
Tessler’s and Amaney Jamal’s “Measuring Support for Democracy in the Arab world and Across 
the Globe”, the authors look at ways in which support has been measured for democracy and 
their opinions on the best ways to measure it in the context of the region (Tessler 1).  The authors 
begin by identifying two different types of measuring support for democracy.  The first is asking 
respondents directly about democracy and its institutions, which are most commonly drawn from 
Dahl’s theory of polyarchy or a minimalist definition of what institutions are necessary for a 
democracy to function (Measuring Support 1).  To this, the authors criticize that people are well-
versed in democratic lingo, and there is no way to know if they are speaking to be politically 
correct, as democracy has almost universally become the one legitimate form of government, or 
whether they truly are democrats (Measuring Support 1).  The politically correct version poses a 
problem for gauging true democratic commitment because many regimes of the Middle East 
speak of democracy because it is appealing, yet have no intention of ceding power to the people.
The second type of analysis for gauging people’s commitment to democratic transition is 
the technique used by the Arab Barometer, which uses “mostly value-oriented indicators as 
proxies for a democratic, political culture,” and this technique shows that people may “support 
democracy, and sincerely, without necessarily possessing a democratic political culture 
orientation” (Measuring Support 2).  This technique, therefore, focuses on attitudes of the “Arab 
Street”, or the assessment of Arab political culture, rather than an assessment of the democratic 
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institutions that are usually designed to hold leaders accountable and act responsibly (Islam and 
Democracy 3).  This study, in the form of a survey about the what the authors have typified as 
being part of a necessary democratic culture, is one of the very few that have emerged in recent 
years.  Much like studies that address Arab authoritarianism, studies of the attitudes towards 
democracy of average citizens in the Arab world are scant.  The survey and methodology 
employed by Tessler and the other researchers is useful for asking questions about democracy 
without actually setting the respondents up for politically correct responses, though there still 
remains the “possibility that many people are simply giving a socially acceptable or politically 
correct response” (Measuring Support 3).  These responses, however, are generally more reliable 
than the first method.  The method is to create a system that would “gauge both individual level 
support for the democratic system as a whole” and the sample’s ability to practice what they 
preach in terms of democratic support (Measuring Support 3, 12).  
Addressing the role of Islam in attitudes towards democracy, the studies which appear in 
the Arab Barometer reveals surprising results that transcend outdated assumptions about Arab 
political culture as it relates to religiosity, the compatibility of Islam with democracy, and 
democratic transition in general.  Such stereotypical arguments advanced that “whereas 
democracy requires openness, competition, pluralism, and tolerance of diversity, Islam, they 
argue, encourages intellectual conformity and an uncritical acceptance of authority”, as well as 
citing the fact that divine word is often placed above the will of the people, leading to the 
authoritarian regimes we see today (Islam and Democracy 5).  
Concerning the relationship between religiosity and politics, trends that have been 
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documented in countries like the United States have usually been used to make assumptions 
about Arab political culture.  Namely, that more religious attachment meant more conservative 
views, and that the more conservative one is, the more general support for security measures and 
a more hawkish foreign policy will be noticed (Islam and Democracy 7).  
The results of these surveys, conducted from 1988-1996, concluded that “despite a 
number of statistically significant relationships, Islam appears to have less influence on political 
attitudes than is frequently suggested by students of Arab and Islamic society” (Islam and 
Democracy 15).  Forming part of this conclusion were the observations made in Morocco, 
specifically, in which “Islamic guidance” in political matters was not an important factor for 
politics as it was for economic issues (Islam and Democracy 15).  Another important trend 
observed contradicts the assumed inverse correlation between religiosity and support for 
democratic principles.  This, Tessler hypothesizes, could be explained by the fact that the 
societies observed were in general more pious than secular societies, such as the United States.  
Personal piety, taken as a common societal thread, would not do much to influence one’s political 
beliefs either to the right or left.  The study concludes that “a democratic, civic, and participant 
political culture may indeed be necessary for mature democracy,” but given the evidence in the 5 
countries observed, including Morocco, “Islam is not the obstacle to democratization that some 
Western and other scholars allege it to be (Islam and Democracy 18).  
Such observations are groundbreaking in how the region should be studied and viewed in 
comparative politics as presuppositions and stereotypes give way to serious, scientific research.  
Such a study poses challenges to authors such as Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, the 
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former who uses more of a classic orientalist approach to addressing the lack of democratization 
in the region, and the latter, whose ”Clash of Civilizations” thesis identified Islam as a distinct 
culture, the tenants of which are largely incompatible with democracy.  Such bases for studying 
the lack of democratization in the Middle East have also been rejected by the authors that follow.  
Authors like Eva Bellin, as mentioned before, reject the notion that Islam is to blame for the lack 
of democratization in the region, citing other religions that were once thought incompatible 
whose societies currently foster the most robust forms of democracies.  
Given the many recent years of study and carefully-planned statistical research 
undertaken by Tessler and his team, this is by far one of the most compelling and scientifically-
sound pieces of data for gauging the opinions of the average Muslim in the Arab world towards 
democracy, despite potential weaknesses in data collection, as noted above.  Given this data, 
therefore, the issue of Arab authoritarianism returns into focus.  If Islam and Arabs’ relationship 
with religion does not statistically seem to create a culture that is inhospitable to democracy, then 
why has democracy not taken root in the region?  The next section of this paper will treat the 
phenomenon of these unusually politically savvy autocrats that have managed to perpetuate their 
rule in the face of international and domestic pressures, and despite the global movement 
towards democratization of societies.  The root of the problem, given these surveys and the 
articles that follow, are the nature of Arab autocracies themselves, and the institutions that keep 
them in power.
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The “Pseudo-democracy in the Muslim World” as a Replacement for Western Democracies
In Volpi’s analysis, he claims that scholars have spent much time classifying regimes in 
the Arab world as to what they lack democratically, holding the liberal notion of democracy-read 
strong, independent institutions that allow for a free political arena in which the majority will 
rule-have colored the study of democracy in the Arab world.  Like author Schlumberger et al, 
Volpi believes that a better scholarly approach is to start with the descriptive before handing 
down a verdict.  As Schlumberger grapples with describing authoritarian regimes and their 
unique hold on power in the Middle East, Volpi writes that the the debate concerning the nature 
of democracy in the Arab world should also follow a similar path.  He writes that democracy in 
the region falls on a spectrum that ranges from a republican-style democracy that is centered 
around evolved concepts of asaybiyya, or group loyalty to the leader or political ideology, to an 
Islamic-style of democracy in which law is based on “Islam as a creed and the community of 
believers (ummah) as the locus for a just society” (Volpi 1066).  This classification of pseudo-
democracy falls between both styles of government and is currently how many governments in 
the Arab world should be classified.  
In explaining the democratic experience in the Middle East, Volpi challenges the notion 
that “democracy” should always be made in reference to what the West thinks about democracy, 
pointing out that “democratic legitimisation does not necessarily coincide with liberal democratic 
norms and processes”, noting the political trend at the end of the 20th century was a deviation 
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from the norm of majoritarian democracy to one that “proposes a type of a democracy that is 
designed to place restraints on majority rule with the view to protect very specific individual 
rights and civil liberties” (Volpi 1063-4).  Volpi’s consideration of cultural views-shaped by the 
Islamic tradition of “communal notions of public virtue or religious orthodoxy” challenges calls 
for direct democracy in order for said-communal preservation, offering an interesting argument 
that addresses alternative reasons for why democracy as the West knows it have not taken root in 
the Arab world.  This forms the fundamental base upon which pseudo-democracies are founded 
in the region, and thus must not be negatively compared with liberal democratic experiences.  
According to Volpi, it should also not be held true that in the presence of democratic institutions, 
a liberal form of democracy would necessarily take hold of the population.  In other words, 
culture and religious experiences seem to be the basis upon which democracy is to be built in the 
Middle East, and thus these pseudo-democracies should be considered as unique political 
phenomena, not as a “a deviation from a ‘democratic’ normative framework and teleological 
order” (Volpi 1061).  
This theory contrasts to the assumptions made in the publication Getting to Pluralism in 
addressing the democratic stalemate in the region, in which a liberal democracy is assumed to be 
the end-goal and which assumes that society would naturally select this democratic style of 
government if given free choice and proper, independent institutions.  In this case, autocrats are 
assumed to have an instrumentalist reason for holding onto power and suppressing their 
population and controlling the political processes themselves to prevent a loss of power (Volpi 
1063).  Volpi’s theory assumes more than just an instrumentalist approach to autocratic rule in 
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the Arab world, considering that it is instead a natural evolution “influenced by evolving 
international ideas about liberal democracy”  that “are also being reconstructed internally by the 
interaction between the elite/counter-elite and the populace” (Volpi 1067).  Both analyses in both 
papers offer insights into and descriptions of the possible points on which the Middle Eastern 
regimes find themselves on the democratic spectrum, and both points of view offer diverging 
views as to how to conceptualize the discussion of democracy in the Arab world.
While thinking of democracy as a spectrum and systems of government as ongoing 
processes of interaction between society and ruling elites, Volpi’s argument begins to shake in his 
criticism of other authors who prefer to to analyze the issue from an institutional standpoint.  He 
distinctly discounts the conventional importance of institutions, such as oppressive security 
apparatuses and the oil rents that form the important pillars of these pseudo-democracies.  In his 
essay, he cites author Eva Bellin as a supporter of this institutional theory that addresses the 
robustness of authoritarian regimes, and indeed her article, as mentioned in this paper, does not 
address the cultural, religious, or Islamic oppositional aspects that color the region’s political 
scene.  Volpi also suggests that it is important to move away from the notion that authoritarians 
are using their powers to suppress and control their population for instrumentalist purposes, 
noting that their grip on power not always considered a negative trait.  He suggests that the 
uniqueness of these pseudo-democracies and their authoritarian flavor is a product of the fear of 
the “Islamic free election trap” (Volpi 1067).  Quite simply, that the rulers’ “interests as well as 
the ‘national interest’ clearly would not be best served by the prompt organisation of free and fair 
elections” as this would “become a means for non-democratic forces to seize power through the 
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ballot box”, as Islamist groups form the strongest oppositional force in the Arab world today 
(Volpi 1067).  Thus, there are few opportunities and reasons for autocrats to “hand over power 
‘gracefully’” (Volpi 1068).  Though his point about an analysis of the democratic experience in 
the Arab world should include one of political culture, Volpi appears to adopt the justification for 
these autocratic regimes and their unchecked executive power because of this Islamist threat.  
Indeed, his argument for considering pseudo-democracies as separate political 
phenomena that are neither negative or positive, but simply “are”, and thus should be considered 
for analysis outside the context of liberal democratic expectations based on the inclusion of 
domestic cultural and political considerations, such as religious influence and the consideration 
of the public good over that of that of the individual.  His argument, however, seems to excuse 
the presence of authoritarianism in the context of the Arab world, as a mere characteristic of 
these states and also seems to suggest that suppression of oppositional groups is justifiable due to 
the mass following that Islamists enjoy.  By doing this, he successfully describes one of the 
techniques that keep autocrats of different stripes in power in the Middle East.  One mistake he 
makes,  however, is lumping all Islamists into one group, ignoring distinctions between moderate 
groups such as the Moroccan Justice and Development Party that are unarmed and part of the 
state’s political apparatus, and extremist groups or those groups who have not yet laid down their 
guns, such as Hamas and Hezbollah.  These groups can further be broken down into armed 
groups “Islamic” groups that are independent from the state and either have nationalist ambitions 
or rally around a common ideological enemy, such as Israel.  Nor does he make a distinction 
between Islamic groups that have evolved to play the political game with experience in elections, 
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such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and those groups that have ideological ambitions of 
collapsing the global order, such as Al-Qaeda.  
This theory of the free election trap is also advanced by author Gregory Gause III.   He 
observes and comments on the rise of Islamist governments or parties in certain Arab countries 
or territories, which fails to take into account the social and political conditions in which they 
rose.  One of the basis of his argument, for example, was the election of Hamas in the 2004 
municipal elections.  It is well known, however, that in 2006, the group was elected because of 
its social programs, cynicism with the political process, the Israeli occupation, and disillusion 
with the Fatah party (CJPME).  These elections had nothing to do with their Islamic character, 
but as a response to what is seen as an ineffective opposition to occupation and the quality of life 
that Hamas provides for the Palestinian people.  The other frequently mentioned case, that of 
Algeria, can be explained in terms of a win as a protest against the past military rule and the 
domination of the FLN in politics that persisted since the end of the French occupation. 
Gause draws from other examples, such as the recent Iraqi elections, which also seem to 
miss the point.  Gause contends that given the recent surge in violence in newly-founded 
democracies such as Iraq, that this somehow implicates that radicalism is necessarily the result of 
a democratic political system.  His connection is a bit clumsy, as Iraq is in the middle of fighting 
what many classify as a civil war, struggling against American occupation, and the fact that the 
Sunni ruling elite has recently been ousted from power and replaced with one that represented 
the larger Shi’a community.  These factors, however, are not addressed in his assessment in the 
democratic experiment that Iraq is undergoing, and his generalizations are draw from a more 
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superficial cause-effect observation rather than an analytical one.  In sum, Volpi and Gause 
categorize Islamic groups too broadly and assumes that if they were elected through free and fair 
elections, that they would abrogate the democratic process and establish an Islamic state.  
The experience of the Moroccan PJD also contradicts the fears laid down by both 
authors.  The PJD has also adopted moderate and even democratic stances towards the Moroccan 
parliamentary election process, especially after the terrorist attacks in Casablanca in 2003.  The 
group has “agreed to accept the Moroccan constitution, pluralism, the role of the king as Amir al-
Mu’minin” (Kaye 155).  The PJD has chosen participation over rejection of the political process, 
even though King Muhammad VI exercises all the real power in Moroccan politics.  The party 
not only acknowledges this, but assures that the monarchy does not contradict its vision of 
democracy, as it enjoys the support of the Moroccan people, though the exact nature of the 
relationship between the monarchy and the political system is one of controlled reform and 
elections (Hamzawy, Interview).  
To better illustrate what Gause’s and Volpi’s oversight in categorizing Islamic groups 
under one heading and thus using it as a crutch to support Arab authoritarianism in their pseudo-
democracies, I draw upon the analysis laid out by Mona El-Ghobashy in the evolution of Islamic 
groups to play politics and moderate as illustrated in Egypt.  It is possible to transfer the 
Egyptian model to the Moroccan Justice and Development Party (PJD) in showing that though 
authoritarian governments are characteristics of pseudo-democracies, Islamic political parties 
and their experience playing the political game have lead to a moderation of their messages.  
This inclusion into politics can help to promote a democratic norms for the parties, either as 
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opposition to check excessive regime oppression. Their exclusion from the process, however, 
would amount to no more than unchecked despotism that is not conducive to any form of 
democracy, be they liberal, republican, or Islamic, as Volpin delineates (Volpi 1070).  Without 
the inclusion of the opposition, in this case the Islamists, pseudo-democracies would be little 
more than blatant dictatorships due to the fact that the liberals, as pointed out by the Getting to 
Pluralism, as the only second source of opposition, are a small minority or have been co-opted 
by the regime.  Without the Islamists in politics, democracy cannot exist. 
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Though most Arab countries fall under the category of autocracy in some form, the extent 
of regime control over society and political institutions varies extensively, from the 
“constitutional” monarchy of Morocco to the police states, such as Syria.  To restrict my 
analysis, therefore, I will concentrate on a state in which political activity is legal and which 
allow competitive, parliamentary elections, and in which oppositional groups are allowed to exist 
and compete in the political process, however superficially.  This opposition, however divided, is 
a necessary component to democratic transition and without it, such as in the police state of Syria 
or the family-run Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the hope of a successful opposition is moot because 
it is not assumed here that a benevolent dictator will suddenly throw down his sword and allow 
for free political competition, as “autocrats do not willingly commit political suicide” (Diamond 
xi).  Regime self-preservation is assumed for the political risks that are associated with a sudden, 
democratic shift in countries with no recent democratic experiments.  Semi-autocracies that 
allow political inclusion of oppositional forces and which encourage some type of popular 
political culture, therefore, are the Middle East’s best chance at fostering democratic transition, 
as they provide a possible political opening to dissenting voices, however narrow or controlled it 
may be.
Moroccan politics encompass all of the components of semi-authoritarian regimes in the 
region, especially the complete control of government institutions and mechanisms to influence 
parliamentary representation and election outcomes.  In terms of democratic infrastructure, 
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however, Morocco boasts a lively parliamentary political participation and democratic 
infrastructure, such as a parliament and courts.    The very existence of such institutions “has 
made Morocco distinct within the Arab world” (Cohen, 51).  This infrastructure is important for 
democratic change in a region in which many regimes target Islamist groups, arresting and 
imprisoning its members, rigging elections, and enacting laws that prohibit Islamist participation 
altogether.  The king, however, in a bid to modernize and reform his country, has allowed 
moderate Islamic groups to participate freely in parliamentary elections.  Even though the 
political system is entirely controlled by the Moroccan king, Muhammad VI, he allows these 
groups to participate in the democratic process.  In political terms, it has produced promising 
results for Morocco’s largest Islamic oppositional force, the Justice and Development Party, or 
simply, the PJD, and its ability to adapt to parliamentary politics.  Thus, it demonstrates how 
Islamists operating under inclusive, semi-democratic systems such as Morocco could potentially 
become a strong oppositional force, as demonstrated in the recent elections of 2002 and 2007. I 
will use the Moroccan example and observations from other Middle Eastern countries to critique 
the widely-held view that if Islamists are allowed to participate in elections, their inclusion 
would lead to a coup d’état of the regime, leading to an abrogation of the democratic process 
through which they came to power.
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The Moroccan Political Experience
  Since 1997, the Moroccan government has opened its political system under a 
policy known as alternance, was the introduction of a limited political opening under the end of 
Hassan II’s rule.  Though his motives are not fully known, it is speculated that the political 
opening would have allowed political parties, such as the popular Union Socialiste des Forces 
Populaires (l’USFP) to take the blame for many unpopular policies initiated by the king in the 
arena of human rights and economic decline.  It is also thought that it would initiate a new 
pluralized system of government that would quell the rise of Islamism in his country.  Other 
factors include international pressures on the regime from international groups demanding 
responses to human rights abuses (Cohen, 51, 58-59).  
During the first parliamentary elections of 1997, two secular parties, Istiqlal and USFP, 
have both sought the protection of the king against the perceived Islamist threat, and form what 
is known as the kutla, a term for parties that were once against the monarchy but now are allied.  
In the election, the USFP won the most votes, was accepted into the government by the king, and 
Istiqlal joined.  This period, known as alternance, was viewed as a permanent state of political 
acceptance as a government party as they “could not even envisage being in the opposition 
again” (Getting 25, Cohen 46-48).  By giving these parties legal legitimacy and by protecting 
them from Islamists, the King was able to divide his opposition and the parties began to consider 
themselves as the government rather than oppositional forces that had plagued his rule since their 
formation after Independence.  This left the newly-formed Islamist party, the Justice and 
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Development Party, as one of the only sources of political opposition in the kingdom.  As 
mentioned in Getting to Pluralism, the secular parties USFP and the Istiqlal are structurally weak 
and “do not trust their capacity to compete” (48).  Referring to their struggle with the Islamists as 
viable opposition, the authors portray these groups as “battling on two fronts, secular parties 
have decided to eliminate one by siding with the monarchy” (48).  
 Morocco, unlike the police states of the Middle East that author Brownlee identifies, has 
a very active political arena that allows for political contestation on a level that does could not 
constitute a true shift of power from the King.  There exists, however, a great deal of security 
detail that operates at the detriment to its citizens, as well as a level of international support for 
the King.  This support is based on superficial changes that he has initiated to the constitution to 
give it more of what was referred to in Getting to Pluralism, as a “veneer of modernity”.  These 
changes have also altered Morocco has made in terms of political competition by allowing 
Islamic groups to compete in elections at the turn of the century.  Social norms were also altered 
with the new personal status code, giving women more power over their own lives, such as 
granting them legal status (Getting 15; The 2007, 3).  These advancements have been praised by 
western countries as genuine steps towards democratic transition. This praise has strengthened 
the King’s legitimacy in the international arena and by many human rights activists.  
The Moroccan state, however, continues to jail journalists and bloggers, as was the case 
with Fouad Mourtada in February 2008 when he created a Facebook profile of one of the King’s 
family members, who had been “blindfolded and beaten unconscious at the time of his 
arrest” (Jail for Facebook).  The recent censorship of two publications of Le Monde is another 
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example of regime control, when the French newspaper published cartoons criticizing the King 
in October 2009 (Morocco Blocks).  There has been an outcry for international condemnation of 
these civil rights and censorship abuses, yet powers such as the US have remained silent, 
convinced that Morocco is moving towards a democracy.  The King has been able to create not a 
police state of total oppression, but undergo a strategy of divide and rule under a partial 
autocratic system of government that allows myriad political parties to develop and compete in a 
political arena that leaves the King’s position unscathed and uncontested.  Such strategy has 
allowed for the appearance of a lively, democratic culture.   Unlike the police states of the 
Middle East, the King has been able to divide and rule without total oppression through a feared 
security apparatus. The power, however, as observed by the authors discussed thus far, remains 
firmly in the hands of the semi-autocrat.  The King has been able to use Western tools of 
democracy to consolidate his power, such as through the the Moroccan constitution, and will be 
discussed next.
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The Moroccan Constitution: Solidifying Semi-Autocratic Rule
Regimes such as the Moroccan monarchy have committed to using modern, democratic-
mimicking institutions, such as the constitution, to their advantage in order to pass laws and 
amendments that perpetuate their rule.  These reforms and amendments, however, do not commit 
to real democratic principles such as less-restrictive elections, checks and balances on power, and 
which could lead to a less restricted political arena in which healthy, societal and political 
discourses can take place.  As Ottaway and Dunne point out in their analysis of Huntington’s 
“King’s Dilemma”, “amending constitutions has turned into a veritable industry” (Getting 15).  
True shifts in the balance of power have not occurred, and instead lead to the entrenchment of 
autocratic rule.  As author Abdelsalam M. Maghraoui notes in his essay, “The Constitution still 
plainly locates sovereignty with the king, limiting the role of the government and the parliament 
to managing social and economic affairs” (73).  
In the case of Morocco, the role of the monarch and his unassailable distance from the 
worries of political competition was solidified in 1972, under the ratification of a new 
constitution.  It established the King as
 “the ‘Commander of the Faithful,’ thereby formally lodging national sovereignty 
with a monarchy that claims divine legitimacy...[which] forbade critical debates over royal 
messages to parliament or the people at large, and removed parliamentary immunity from 
legislators deemed to be questioning the monarchy, Islam, or the laws of the nation” 
(Maghraoui 71).
The Constitution begins by guaranteeing freedoms and human rights, as well as the 
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creation of three separate branches of government, or the necessary institutions for democracy to 
take root.  Though the bureaucracy is present, the autonomy of each branch is not.  Through the 
modern appearance of a constitutional monarchy, the King effectively controls every aspect of 
the government.  The Constitution stipulates that the king names the Prime Minister and can 
dismiss him, is able to dismiss the PM’s cabinet and dismiss the government by dissolving both 
Chambers of Parliament, and is in charge of appointing the top court officials, even though “the 
judiciary authority is independent from legislative and executive power” (Chambre).  Concerning 
security issues, the King reserves the right in Article 352 to “take warranted measures to 
necessitate the defense of territorial integrity, the return of constitutional institutions operations, 
and the management of State affairs” under the vague qualification of an “event” which could 
leave “constitutional operations susceptible” (Chambre).  This vague terminology is left to be 
interpreted by the King.  
One of the most important measures in the constitution, however, lies under Title XII, on 
The Revision of the Constitution, of which “the initiative of the revision of the constitution 
belongs to the King, the Chamber of Representatives, and the Chamber of Councilors”, to which 
the King appoints the top, influential posts (Chambre).  The King, being of sacred nature and the 
final arbitrator of the law, in Article 106 is protected indefinitely from removal: “The 
monarchical nature of the state, as well as the relative arrangements concerning the Muslim 
religion cannot be the object of constitutional revision” (Chambre).  Through modern 
institutions, though not a product of social contract à la John Locke, the King has been able to 
produce a democratic document without ceding any real power, and indeed strengthening his 
2 See sources page for original text of these articles from which I translated 
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position to a level that is almost untouchable under the current political arrangement.  Through 
the manipulation of political tools associated with modernity, such as the Constitution, new laws 
in human and women’s rights with the personal status code, and the increase in pluralistic 
political activity at the end of the 20th century, the King has been able to deflect international 
pressure to politically liberalize while gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the international 
community.  Brumberg cleverly draws a parallel to the Soviet Constitution, writing that “They 
guarantee freedom speech, but not freedom after speech” (43).  In the case of Morocco, the status 
of the King as the Commander of the Faithful has been enshrined in the constitution, and thus 
these freedoms or guarantees given to the people by the constitution are legitimate unless they 
“infringe upon ”national” or “Islamic” values”, such as the case with the trial of the cartoonist 
after the publication of offensive cartoons against the royal family in late 2009 (Brumberg 43, 
Morocco Blocks).  
This is a case in which international pressure has failed to achieve any democratic results, 
and thus explains, like in Brownlee’s thesis, why international pressure has not seemed to spur 
democratic transition.  Yet his thesis is interesting in that past pressures on Morocco have led to a 
less oppressive, more politically active state that is indeed a model for contemporary Arab states 
on their way towards liberalizing politically.  It may be because of international pressure or ties 
with western countries, especially France and the United States, that have kept it from slipping 
into the political choke hold of Asad’s Syria.  Though a cause-effect mechanism is too complex 
to be decipher in this case, it is a possibility that there is a link between the two styles of 
international involvement and the degree of repression of the state under investigation.  Again, 
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more research in the area is needed.  
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Moderation and Democracy in Context
It is above all important to recognize what democratic reform means in the Middle East: 
executive control over the political process and the instituting of social and in some cases, 
political reforms, as in the case of Morocco.  The King has allowed the Islamist Justice and 
Development Party to participate in politics in order to either give a semblance of reform and 
modernization or to have the opposition present for its own sake.  The power, however, still lies 
in the hands on the monarch, who chooses who will and will not participate in politics.  The 
institutions that hold the actual power have not changed, yet the democratic process is allowed to 
continue for the sake of better governance and as an outlet for the people to voice their concerns.  
In addition to the reality of who controls the political system, it is also important to recognize 
another possible motive for allowing Islamists participate in politics: their eventual moderation 
as they interact with the democratic process, thus reducing the challenge to the authoritarian 
regime.  As El-Ghobashy observes with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, groups tend to leave 
behind the calls for the establishment of an Islamic state and begin to focus on social issues and 
government corruption.  In Morocco, the PJD, though never a radical Islamist organization, was 
included in the political process because of its moderation and commitment to the democratic 
process and parliamentary politics.  In contrast, Gregory Gause’s thesis that democracy breeds 
extremism does not take into account of the unique sociopolitical situations of each country that 
he chooses to cite as problems, namely Palestine and Iraq, which are experiencing devastating 
turbulence, war, and occupation.  His theory is further weakened in what he implies the word 
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“democracy” should mean in this part of the world.  He assumes that a democratic process must 
be total and penetrate every echelon of the political power hierarchy, which is simply not the 
case in Morocco.  Islamist participation in this country is heavily monitored, and the King can 
decide to ban them at any time.  There have been democratic reforms, and the country is 
arguably more democratic in the sense of parliamentary elections than in the past, yet it is still 
the executive that holds the power.  Islamist participation in the democratic process, therefore, is 
possible and is highly desirable to moderate their goals, alleviate frustrating oppression, and to 
acknowledge the political reality that these groups do exist and have a popular support structure.  
Their inclusion is necessary for modernization and the development of democratic, 
representative politics, and the Moroccan model should be an example for the rest of the region’s 
authoritarian regimes.
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Mona El-Ghobashy’s Analysis of
Moderation Through Participation: The Political Islamist Experience
 Mona El-Ghobashy thesis concerning Islamist inclusion or interaction with the political 
process leads to a more moderate platform and ideology which is geared more towards domestic 
and social issues, as well as fighting corruption.  By using El-Ghobashy’s theory as a model, it is 
possible to critique the theory that Gregory Gause advances, namely that Islamist inclusion into 
the government will create a spiraling effect that will end with an intolerant, terror-producing, 
Islamic state.  In comparing these two thesis, I argue that inclusive government policies of 
Islamic groups is not a danger and can actually help legitimize the democratic process and 
moderate these Islamist groups.  If El-Ghobashy is correct, then not only does she succeed in 
over turning Gregory Gause’s thesis, but also in offers a promising opportunity for inclusionary 
politics in other countries in which Islamist political participation has been limited or non-
existent.  In using Morocco as a case study in which to apply these theories of democratic 
participation, I show that Islamists have claimed or proven that they have wanted to work with 
the government and are dedicated to the democratic process, and their moderate approach and 
dedication to fight corruption that the ruling elite exemplify may bode well for political society 
in general. 
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El-Ghobashy’s Case Study: 
Lessons from Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: A Tendency and Strategy for Political Opposition
To analyze the participation of the Islamic political parties during their interaction with 
the political process in Morocco, I employ El-Ghobashy’s theory in which she lays out her case 
study of the Muslim Brotherhood’s interaction with the Egyptian government beginning in the 
1980s.  She observes that the organization suffered from an ideological split during the last 
decade, causing a “capitalization on Egypt’s sliver of electoral competition for seats in 
Parliament...[that has] had an especially profound effect on their political thought and 
organization” and the Brotherhood’s inclusion of “moderate Islamist thinkers’ works 
authenticating democracy with Islamic concepts” (El-Ghobashy 374).  The Brotherhood has been 
shaped by institutional constraints in a bid for representative power that has forced it to moderate 
and even reshape its policies and ideologies, and to break with the old guard as a new generation 
has taken over the organization.  This new ideology, as a result of interaction with the political 
process, has diverted its attention to more non-religious issues, such as freedom from political 
oppression and social issues and has all but abandoned the call for an Islamic state.  Though it 
has been unable to bring about any real institutional change and despite its former hardline, 
Islamist ideology, it must compete within the framework of the semi-democratic institution in 
which it finds itself.  In other words, the Muslim Brotherhood has recognized that political 
participation is the only way to gain a semblance of power, no matter how symbolic it might be 
at the moment.  The Brotherhood has legitimized the democratic process for Islamic groups, 
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though the government interferes with the democratic process and arrested members of the 
organization from time to time.  This trend has been observed by many authors, including 
Carnegie Endowment researcher Leslie Campbell, who also argues that interaction with a 
competitive political system makes Islamists more practical (Campbell).
 Indeed, her thesis has been supported by other authors, such as Ellen Lust-Okar, noting 
that in political systems in which the opposition is divided, “moderates who previously 
challenged incumbent elites may choose not to do so when radical groups enter, even if 
incumbents have not accommodated their own demands” (147).  Such a theory can be applied to 
the case of Morocco, in which the King has adopted a divide and rule strategy, pitting 
oppositional groups against one another in hopes to keep them busy politicking while he acts as 
the final arbitrator.  In such a system, moderates will do better or risk being excluded from the 
legitimate political process.  This culture of self-moderation in pushing for party issues advanced 
by Lust-Okar is produced so as not to “force the regime to punish the moderates by further 
constricting their avenues of participation” (Enduring 132).  
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Strategic Considerations of the King and the PJD
In supporting El-Ghobasy’s thesis, and perhaps adding to the understanding of why 
Islamists chose to participate in the bleak political process, Getting to Pluralism also points out 
that decision to participate on their part is tactical.  Such tactics are important for understanding 
why Islamists would participate if the possibility of real political change is impossible as dictated 
by current institutions, such as the Moroccan Constitution.   In Carnegie’s Getting to Pluralism, 
Islamists are said to run in elections that are rigged with little or no chance of a success at the 
risk of their parties appearing weak in the face of defeat.  They also risk alienating supporters 
who already believe that their ideology is being compromised through by political participation 
(Getting 87).  The decision, however, could be justified if the group plans to show that they are 
committed to the democratic process, despite the inevitable loss.  The refusal to participate, 
however, could deal a double blow to the group’s image and to any possibility of change.  A 
group that does not participate would appear to be flippant to democracy when results will not 
return in their favor, and a group which does not condone violence and has refused political 
participation is left powerless to influence politics on any level (Getting 87).
To return to and apply El-Ghobasy’s theory of eventual political moderation to 
Morocco, I have chosen to use the Justice and Development Party (PJD) to illustrate the 
interaction between the state and the Islamist parties and the strategies that both groups use in 
this political game.  The PJD currently constitutes the second largest opposition party, after 
securing 46 of the 325 seats in Parliament during the 2007 elections (Al-Khalfi).  The basic 
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platform has “focused most of its parliamentary activities on increasing transparency and 
fighting corruption, issues that appeal to Islamist and non-Islamist voters alike” while using 
Islam as a “point of reference” (Wegner, Hamzawy, Interview).  The party, however, tends to 
put forth a relationship of “rapprochement” with the government and “accepts the 
monarchy’s religious and legal status as well as the existing political order” (Kaye 146).  This 
position, illustrating the strategic decisions mentioned above, have costed the party, however, 
especially in terms of votes in the 2007 parliamentary elections.  By choosing a path of 
rapprochement with the government in order to be allowed an Islamic voice in parliament, 
the party has been criticized by other Islamic organizations in Morocco, such as the 
Movement for Justice and Charity.  The Movement claims that reforming the political system 
is impossible due to its inherent corrupt nature, and has thus not participated in politics since 
its founding (The 2007, 4).  According to Carnegie author Amr Hamzawy, “the popularity of 
the fundamental opposition rhetoric of Justice and Charity among Islamist constituencies has 
kept the PJD from mobilizing wide segments of the disenfranchised population”, who elect to 
boycott the elections (The 2007, 4).  
As far as the monarch is concerned, the strategy of inclusion of the Islamists can be 
viewed in two lights.  The first is what Brumberg refers to as dissonance politics and is a 
survival technique, using inclusion as an instrument of preserving power.  This view is also 
shared by the authors of Getting to Pluralism, who write that reform introduction is “a 
controlled process to introduce change only where and when it suits the goals of the  ruling 
establishment” (Getting 32).  This contrasts to Volpi’s thesis, which rests upon the 
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assumption that the nature of this type of government is a natural development that can be 
found in most governments around the world.  The inclusion of Islamic parties is a natural 
phenomenon as they enjoy a wide-range of support, and the partial autocracy is to be 
considered a byproduct of a unique political experience that should not be compared to 
Western expectations or models of democracy.  Given the evidence, one should be cautious 
of adopting one view wholeheartedly over the other.  Certainly, the region does not have very 
successful interactions with democracy after colonialism.  The region’s interaction, therefore, 
with and interpretation of democracy, along with its recent political history, does not bode 
well for democratic experiments.  The prominence of strong security apparatuses that possess 
the will and ability to suppress dissenters, however, only mean to perpetuate the phenomenon 
of the autocrat in the Arab world, as pointed out by Bellin.  Both views should be considered 
together, as the politics of the region have a long, intertwined history with colonialism, failed 
and successful political experiments, and attempts at political ruling models that have been 
imposed from within and from without.  These autocrats are the product of the Arab political 
and historical experience.
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Point and Counterpoint: Islamic Threat to Democracy or Arab Democrats?
To depart from El-Ghobashy’s encouraging view of the evolution of extremist Islamist 
groups to more moderate ones with interaction with the political system, I return to the 
observations and conclusions of Gregory Gause.  In his article, “Can Democracy Stop 
Terrorism?”, Gause focuses on his observation that democracy in the Middle East may produce 
regimes that are unfavorable to US interests, with particular emphasis on the Islamists coming to 
power.  He cites several examples of Islamists coming to power through the electoral process.  
For examples, he writes of Hamas’s victory in the 2004 municipal elections, and the PJD victory 
in Morocco in 2002, which took 42 of the 325 parliamentary seats, writing that “the trend in 
clear: Islamists of various hues score well in free elections” and “the more democratic the Arab 
world gets, the more likely it is that Islamists will come to power” (Gause).   Another of the most 
frequently-cited examples in literature under the banner of this theory is the case of Algeria 
during the 1990-91 election, in which the Islamic FIS party, which had promised a radical and 
extremist agenda, would have won parliamentary elections, had it not been for the army’s 
intervention to annul the electoral results.  
In addition to being contradicted by El-Ghobashy, Gausse’s theory does not hold up to 
further proof presented by Professor Mark Tessler, who points out that the success of many 
Islamic groups across the Arab world can be attributed to their willingness to adapt and conform 
to the rules of the political game in which other oppositional groups must operate.  In supporting 
El-Ghobashy’s thesis about the eventual moderation of Islamic groups in interacting with the 
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government and other political parties in parliament, Tessler comments that “participation in the 
democratic process may even to some degree alter the views and leadership structure of Muslim 
political movements, further moderating and ”normalizing” those Islamist groups that acquire a 
share of legitimate political power” (Handelman 283).  In addition to Professor Tessler, Marina 
Ottaway writes in another article that “there is ample evidence that participation in an electoral 
process forces any party, regardless of ideology, to moderate its position if it wants to attract 
voters in large numbers and avoid a backlash” (Ottaway, Islamists).  She, along with other 
optimists, confirm El-Ghobashy’s observation of the moderation of Islamist groups the more 
they interact with the constraints that democratic processes present these groups and the actual 
needs of their constituents.
Again, the experience of the Justice and Development Party in Morocco also seems to 
contradict the prediction of Gause’s theory that as Islamists are included into the government, 
instability and will ensue and that democracy would bring about an intolerant, anti-Western 
Islamic government.  In all cases, Islamists have failed to obtain enough votes in parliamentary 
elections to constitute powerful enough oppositional forces to the incumbent regime or to have 
been included in the government, such as has been done with many liberal groups, as is pointed 
out in Getting to Pluralism.
Gause’s theory also underestimates the actual real power that the executive branch holds 
over their governments, as presented earlier in this paper, and thus ignores the central tenant to 
what current Arab pseudo-democracies are bound. King Muhammad is able to marginalize or co-
opt any party he wishes into his government, and has the executive power to curb Islamic 
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political activity if he wishes.  One such example of the exercise of his authority is the 
requirement “that mosques close to the public shortly after Friday services to prevent use of the 
premises for unauthorized political activity” (United States).  It is a system that only tolerates 
moderate voices and means to limit the space in which Islamists can gather.  
Gause’s argument is therefore based on a narrow interpretation of what it means for a 
political system to be democratic; namely that the whole system, including the election of 
executives in addition to parliament, must hold free and fair elections.  He also does not mention 
that the power does not rest in the hands of these political parties and the people, as it does in say 
the United States and other Western democracies, but that it is uniquely and unassailably in the 
hands of the executive, as previously mentioned above, and is a feature of Volpin’s semi-
autocracy.  
As consequence of this executive reality, Islamic parties in the Arab world have been 
forced to make tactical decisions, such as how many candidates to field.  In Getting to Pluralism, 
the authors cite parties like Morocco’s PJD as fielding candidates “in just over half of the 91 
election districts before fielding candidates in 94 districts out of 95 in the 2007 elections (Getting 
80).  In summary, this tactical dilemma that faces Islamists is that, ”unlike most parties...they 
cannot afford to win too many seats-and can even less afford to win the elections for fear that the 
government will take drastic action against them” (Getting 80).  
Gause, and scholars that hold his pessimistic view of Islamists and their participation in 
parliamentary politics, conjecture the outcome of participation without thought to the means 
Islamists must use to obtain election or sustained political involvement.  Gause gives no 
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consideration is given to El-Ghobasy’s theory, and it is assumed these groups will continue on 
extremist platforms,  stagnant and unevolved, an unrealistic conjecture given the competitive 
nature of parliamentary politics.  No consideration is given to the variety of Islamic groups that 
appear in the Arab world, as previously mentioned.  Like Volpi, there is no focus on the possible 
specific nature of groups that want to compete politically, and a broad, poisonous generalization 
is cast over the term “Islamist”.  Unlike Gause, however, however, Volpi does recognize the 
political reality of the semi-autocracy and who controls political power.  Both, however, 
underestimate the power of political competition and its effects on those involved in the process.  
The main problem that lies in this theory of the eventual abrogation of the democratic 
processes is that it is mostly hypothetical.  As pointed out in Getting to Pluralism, the evidence 
provided about the outcome of Islamists coming to power is mixed.  The authors make a 
distinction between participation under “normal” and “siege” conditions.  Under normal 
conditions, Islamists operate under “the same conditions that affect all opposition actors in that 
country” (Getting 82).  Under siege conditions, Islamists are blatant targets of government 
oppression, including raids on group meetings, arrests by the security forces, and even rendering 
religious parties illegal, as in Egypt (Getting 85-6).  In reference to the oversights above, Gause 
seems to assume that the inherent nature of these groups is more important than the conditions 
under which they are forced to operate.  The environment is so important in determining the 
course of political action taken by a group not only because “it can provide incentives or erect 
obstacles to participation but also because most Islamist parties and movements are quite divided 
internally.  Thus, external circumstances easily alter the internal balance of power between 
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reformist and hardline factions” (Getting 82).  Moderation, therefore, as proposed by El-
Ghobashy, would depend on external factors.  She assumes participation is possible, so her 
theory would be valid under “normal” conditions.  It is under siege conditions that Islamist 
opposition remains dangerous.  The question would be, therefore, whether or not the nature of 
the party (Islamist or liberal) would matter under such hostile conditions when trying to gauge 
their possible responses to political repression.  The response generated has nothing to do with an 
Islamic character, but rather that of an brutally repressed political group.
Even if the executive’s role comes under the oversight of the legislative branch, the 
internal structure of the PJD are democratic and committed to the political process and a vision 
of pluralistic, politic body as demonstrated by their continued political participation after they 
failed to gain majority opposition status after the 2007 election.  Instead of “boycotting elections, 
abandoning political participation, or even engaging in clandestine activities” like other 
disenfranchised Islamist parties, the PJD resisted “the temptation to withdraw from politics to 
signal its grievances over the political and electoral process” (Al-Khalafi).  Unlike radical 
Islamists who reject the authority of the state, “the legalized...Islamists see...lawful electoral 
mobilization as their tools and exhibit a strong will to participate in the political 
system” (Zeghal).  In addition to this commitment to the democratic process, Islamic leaders, 
according to Amr Hamzawy, “desire to show their constituencies the role they can play as active 
participants in the process of political and social reform” as was the focus of the PJD during the 
2007 election (Boon).  
This commitment to the democratic process is necessary because the possible 
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fragmentation of the group in the event of a drastic change in party ideology and goals would 
fracture it to the point of ineffectiveness, causing it to lose the wide-ranging support it holds over 
the varying religious and non-religious groups in the country.  A deviation from its moderate 
ideology could possibly fragment the PJD and render it ineffective at implementing Shari’a or an 
Islamic state if it indeed did turn radical.  Gause’s theory falls short of reality when confronted 
with the Moroccan example, and even the Muslim Brotherhood, the case from which El-
Ghobasy draws her ideas about the nature of Islamist inclusion. 
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Breaking the Political Deadlock: A Proposed Alliance
The political situation does indeed seem frustratingly hopeless for democrats.  In the 
paper “Incumbent Regimes and the ‘King’s Dilemma’ in the Arab world”, Marina Ottaway and 
Michele Dunne assert that ”power...remains firmly where it was: in the hands of kings and 
presidents” (Incumbent Regimes 1).  In the case of Morocco, for example, the reform process...is 
not meant to lead to democracy but only to a  more liberal environment and better 
governance” (Incumbent Regimes 10).  In sum, the actual institutions of Moroccan politics, 
namely total control by the King, have remained untouched while a policy of controlled social 
and economic reforms have been implemented in order to modernize the country and allow more 
inclusive party policies.  True political reform that would distribute more political power and 
controls to the parliament is not the King’s intention (Getting, 25).  Gause assumes that 
democratic reforms in the Middle East would mean that the government would totally relinquish 
its power to such parties, if they were indeed popular enough.  Moroccan politics show the 
opposite and that their inclusion into the political apparatus is possible without a shift in 
executive power, and is a perfect illustration of what Volpin refers to as semi-autocracies of the 
Middle East, caught somewhere on the political spectrum between autocracy and democracy.
This bleak political outlook for democratization and the redistribution of executive 
power, however, does not mean that democratic reforms cannot be implemented.  Indeed, 
personal freedoms in Morocco have been enhanced with the new personal status law, a true 
victory for human rights activists  (Incumbent Regimes 9).  Concerning oppositional forces, one 
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of the most important positions that they occupy in countries such as Morocco is that they keep 
pressure on the government to fulfill promised obligations by being allowed to compete in the 
political arena.  This political arena, however divided and manipulated by the ruler, is an 
important stage for publicly voicing concerns about the direction of their country politicly, 
socially, and economically, and their participation acts as a block that keeps the door to political 
pluralism and discussion open, and not closed like the autocracies and police states of Saudi 
Arabia and Syria.  
Identified as one of the three key political players Arab politics, Islamists also possess the 
necessary support to foment formidable opposition to the regimes and push for reforms.  Islamic 
groups such as the PJD often provide necessary social services that the government cannot or 
does not, and they also derive their support from the those who often vote for Islamic parties as 
protest to rigged elections and to the regime in general.  While these voters do not necessarily 
constitute a core support pillar for groups like the PJD, they are important to consider for 
understanding why Islamists are so popular.  No matter the the reasons for voting for such 
groups, it is support nonetheless.  
Moderate Islamic groups, such as the PJD also show promising prospects for the 
perpetuation of the few democratic tendencies that can be observed in semi-autocracies across 
the Arab world.  They have effectively legitimized the modern nation state and relinquished 
notions of a unified ummah under the Caliphate system (Getting 70).  They have also legitimized 
the democratic process by participating and attempting to adhere to democratic principles within 
their organizations, unlike many of the secular groups, which have their own forms of internal 
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authoritarianism, suffering from “old leadership, ossified cadres, and lack of internal democracy” 
(Getting 44).  Many Islamists take what Ottaway calls a “maximalist” position.  Such groups, 
such as Morocco’s PJD, assume that they have to “participate in order to prove themselves 
responsible political actors” (Getting 93).  
Another advantage that this position has brought is the dedication to a rather uniform 
position on the political process for groups like the PJD.  This allays internal rumblings between 
moderates and hardliners, a symptom of Islamic political groups that often keeps them weak.  
When a clear position is taken and stances on issues are clearly identified, the opposition can 
effectively mobilize against the regime.  Also, unlike the secular groups, they have not been co-
opted by the regime, especially in Morocco, in which the PJD forms the largest independent 
oppositional force.  This independence has won them a great deal of credibility, and offers a 
possible stepping stone towards a more democratic future.  What keeps the PJD in Morocco 
weak is not attributed to the many internal divides that keep other Islamist groups weak, but 
rather the Moroccan parliamentary system of proportional representation.  As mentioned earlier, 
the government allows for over 30 political parties to participate in elections.  In addition to this, 
the group was not invited to join the government in the past 2 elections even after a surprising 
victory in 2002.  
It is clear that in order for the PJD to have a larger impact of the political process and 
perhaps open up the democratic process further, there needs to be reform of the legislative 
branch.  But this would of course lead to a circular argument: in order for the opposition to be 
more effective, the ruler must decide to open up the political process, and in order to effectively 
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pressure him to do so, it would require an effective and powerful opposition, which is currently 
kept weak by a carefully manufactured political arena to distance the monarch from power 
contestation.  As these semi-autocrats in the region do not have a history of committing political 
suicide, the conversation goes nowhere.  Yet the authors of Getting to Pluralism suggest that 
“the decision of Islamist parties and movements to participate in the legal politics 
of their countries triggers a set of complicated processes: within the leadership of the 
parties and movements involved; between them and their followers; and of course between
 the participating Islamists and the ruling establishments and secular opposition parties 
of their countries.  It is the outcome of these three different sets of processes that will 
determine the future trajectory of participating Islamists” (95).  
This assertion is rather broad and general, and thus leaves the possibility open to a more detailed 
analysis of regime-opposition relations, as well as deeper study into the relationship between 
oppositional forces of the secularists and Islamists.  Perhaps a breakthrough in uniting the secular 
and Islamist forces could be an effective strategy for pushing for democratic change in countries 
such as Morocco.  Such an alliance would have to overcome years of mistrust and stereotypical 
assessments about the other.  The secular parties would have to rethink their relationship of 
dependence on the regime for protection against the Islamists, reform their internal organizations 
to become more democratic, and identify solid party platforms that could be agreed upon with 
the Islamists.  
The fear of Islamists derailing the democratic process must also be set aside.  As 
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mentioned earlier, groups like the PJD who have dedicated themselves to the political process 
and elections and have legitimized diverse political groups through competing with them, have 
little incentive to abrogate democracy, as this could potentially destroy their party from the inside 
out and lose their broad base of support.  Islamists would be left a much weaker, discredited 
group in the eyes of citizens already largely politically apathetic.  Such an alliance between the 
two groups could also spur mass support and political mobilization, giving the population hope 
that breaking this deadlock would allow a voice in addressing their economic, social, and 
political problems that these partial autocracies have thus far been unable to address effectively.  
A unified opposition, made up of Islamist and secular elements would better represent the 
spectrum of political opinions found in the Arab world, adding to a richer, more vibrant form of 
democracy unlike Western models of democracy, and one that is uniquely Arab.
Matthew Ward








Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Middle East
22 Dec 2009
69
Conclusion: The Complexities of Arab Semi-Authoritarianism 
This paper has attempted to shed light upon the discussion concerning what the Carnegie 
Foundation for International Peace’s Getting to Pluralism calls a political “stalemate” between 
the three important actors of Arab politics: the regime, Islamists, and secularists (Getting  11).  In 
order to do this, it was necessary to first prove that the region must be viewed as not progressing 
upon the path of democratization, and that arguments contrary to this were ignoring the uniquely 
fundamental roots of Arab regimes in power.  Without contestation of executive power or 
restraints upon that power, democracy cannot flourish. 
 It was then necessary to address the history of how the phenomena of authoritarianism 
has been studied in the region and its until-recent-absence in the literature of comparative 
politics, along with two discussions about democracy in the region.  The first addresses popular 
attitudes towards the system of governance and challenge common political stereotypes and 
orientalist approaches that lead to dead end conclusions that Islam is the anti-democratic culprit.  
The second example of how to view democracy in the Arab world was that of a uniquely-
produced experience that has been shaped by political history, culture, and evolutionary 
necessity.  Though not a perfect vision of how to consider democratic experiences in the Arab 
world and to which there are many criticisms,  the most important lesson from this vantage point 
is to provide an alternative to Western expectations of democracy and the rejection of absolutes 
in the process of democratization, identifying regime types like Morocco moving on a spectrum 
somewhere between autocracy and democracy, or a pseudo-democracy.
After a discussion of democracy, I focused on the the phenomenon of the Arab autocrat, 
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analyzing essays that address institutions as reasons for the robustness of Arab autocracies such 
as security apparatuses, election rigging, divide and rule tactics, and the importance of 
international permission on restraining or validating the actions of Arab autocrats.  
I then discussed the practical application of these concepts to the monarchy of Morocco.  
Morocco was chosen because of its abnormally rich parliamentary tradition for the region, along 
with its lively political culture and diversity, and the allowance of Islamists to compete rather 
freely in elections.  Such conditions are the most conducive to taking advantage of political 
openings during the process of democratization.  I discussed Morocco’s recent political history 
that led to a political opening for parliamentary politics to flourish, and the experience of 
Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD) and their interaction with a political game ill-
defined by the regime.  I addressed the strategies used by both this Islamist party and their 
considerations for participating in the political process, as well as strategies that the monarch 
considers when allowing such potentially-powerful opposition groups to compete.  I also 
discussed the institutions that keep the opposition in Morocco weak, such as the Constitution and 
the parliamentary politics that take advantage of the pluralistic nature of Morocco.
After addressing Morocco’s political experience and the strategies employed by two of 
the most powerful political players in the Arab world, I addressed the widely-held fear of 
Islamist participation and the possible detriment they may pose for democracy.  I countered this 
argument with the observed trend of their moderation after sustained interaction with the 
democratic process under “normal” conditions.  After discussing the nature of Islamist 
participation, I discussed the benefits that Islamists provide to democratization, and the 
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possibility of an Islamist-secularist alliance in breaking the political stalemate and fomenting an 
effective, political status-quo-altering division of power that could come with the two principle 
opposition groups uniting.  
In the end, the political situation in the Middle East is one of great complexity that can 
only briefly touched on in a paper of this scope.  The field of research is in need of more study of 
the nature of Arab semi-autocracies, more surveys concerning the political attitudes and 
tendencies of the average citizen, and a deeper understanding and study of regime-opposition 
dynamics and even the dynamics between oppositional groups.  This emerging field in political 
science is encouraging at getting to the root of the last vestiges of authoritarianism in the world.  
It also shows that all three actors, the Islamists, secularists, and the incumbent regimes have 
difficult decisions to make concerning the futures of their society and people.  The stalemate 
cannot be broken without one of the groups making a political move.  Without it, the people who 
are governed by the whims of authoritarian regimes and their regime-perpetuating tactics will 
continue to suffer economically, politically, and socially in a world that is moving ever forward 
towards integration and democratization.   
Matthew Ward








Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Middle East
22 Dec 2009
72
Excerpts of the Moroccan Constitution (Original Text)
TITRE II 
 
DE LA ROYAUTE 
ARTICLE 23:
 




Le Roi nomme le Premier ministre. 
Sur proposition du Premier ministre, Il nomme les autres membres du Gouvernement, Il peut  
mettre fin à leurs fonctions. 
Il met fin aux fonctions du Gouvernement, soit à Son initiative, soit du fait de la démission du 
Gouvernement.  
ARTICLE 35:
Lorsque l'intégrité du territoire national est menacée ou que se produisent des événements 
susceptibles de mettre en cause le fonctionnement des institutions constitutionnelles, le Roi 
peut, après avoir consulté le président de la Chambre des Représentants. le président de la 
Chambre des Conseillers ainsi que le président du Conseil Constitutionnel, et adressé un 
message à la Nation, proclamer, par dahir, l'état d'exception. De ce fait, Il est habilité, 
nonobstant toutes dispositions contraires, à prendre les mesures qu'imposent la défense de 
l'intégrité territoriale, le retour au fonctionnement des institutions constitutionnelles et la 
conduite des affaires de l'Etat. 
L'état d'exception n'entraîne pas la dissolution du Parlement. 
Il est mis fin à l'état d'exception dans les mêmes normes que sa proclamation. 
Titre V
DES RAPPORTS ENTRE LES POUVOIRS - DES RAPPORTS ENTRE LE ROI 
ET LE PARLEMENT
 ARTICLE 71: 
Le Roi peut, après avoir consulté les présidents des deux Chambres et le président du 
Conseil Constitutionnel et adressé un message à la Nation, dissoudre, par dahir, les deux 
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Chambres du Parlement ou l'une d'elles seulement.
TITRE VII 
 




L'autorité judiciaire est indépendante du pouvoir législatif et du pouvoir exécutif. 
TITRE XII




L'initiative de la révision de la Constitution appartient au Roi, à la Chambre des Représentants 
et à la Chambre des Conseillers. 





La forme monarchique de l'Etat ainsi que les dispositions relatives à la religion musulmane ne 
peuvent faire l'objet d'une révision constitutionnelle. 
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